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Brief of Defendant-Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This being an action in equity instituted for the pur-
pose of impressing a trust on the title to real estate 
known as Tracts A (Dayton) and B (Union Co-op), legal 
title to which has been in defendant J. B. Walker for 
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forty-two years, it is essential for this Court to not only 
review the facts, but also to review the evidence in ih 
context, not thrown in haphazardly and piecemeal as 
appellants have sought to do in their statement of the 
ease and statement of the facts. We deem it therefore 
necessary to a proper presentation of this case and to a 
clear understanding of the findings and decision of th~ 
Trial Court that defendant J. B. Walker restate the 
facts in context. 
For purposes of identification, reference was made 
throughout the trial to the plat (Ex. P-22) (R- 102-104). 
The area in orange is the tract referred to in the testi-
mony as the Dayton tract (R. 103) acquired by defend-
ant .J. B. Walker from Dayton, also ref erred to as Parcel 
A in the Complaint. The areas in green are the tracts 
that were in the name of Union Co-op and were acquired 
by defendant J.B. Walker from the Utah Association of 
Credit Men (R. 103-104). Those areas are referred to as 
Tract B in the Complaint. 
The areas in blue still stand on the records in the 
name of John A. Walker, whose estate has been in pro-
bate since 1912, and is involved only to the extent that 
defendant has paid the taxes on it for which he claims 
credit, and it is material because H. A. Smith (father 
of Alma Smith) was handling the probate proceedings 
at the same time that he was also handling a condemna-
tion proceeding brought by Salt Lake County to acquire 
a right-of-way through a portion of the estate prop-
erty and Dayton tract for canal purposes. He ·was also 
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n·pl'C'Rl'llting the vValkers in the action brought by Dayton 
;llHl 1111• ..'\ssociation of Credit Men to foreclose and sell 
11nt t !1e famil.v home and the store. It was tliat litigation 
,1 ll<l t Ii r family attempt to salvage the family property 
tliat e<rnsr<l the heirs, including plaintiffs and their 
mot lwr, who is now dead, to execute in 1922 the agree-
mcllt (11~x. 7) '"hich was prepared by 1\Ir. Smith, Sr. and 
\U1S tlwll signed by the members of the family, and which 
,\fr. Smith proceeded to place in his safe, where it was al-
tngc·tlwr forgotten by everyone now alive. Apparently 
110 one knew of its existenence as a signed document until 
it was unearthed by Alma Smith, the son of H. A. Smith, 
just prior to the time of pre-trial hearing (R. 160-161). 
Jt is esRe11tial that this background be understood by this 
('.ourt; othewise the conduct of the parties during this 
prriorl of forty-two years is altogether incomprehensible. 
The plaintiffs '"ere unaware of its existence when they 
filrd this action, and denied its existence (R. 254-256). 
·when shown a copy of it at the time of taking the deposi-
tion of J. B. Walker, the attorney for plaintiffs denied 
that it had ever been signed (P. 28 of the deposition of 
J. B. \Valker), and the principal witness for plaintiff, 
R. K ·walker, denied that he had ever seen it or had ever 
si_g-11ed it when his deposition was taken (R. 254-256). 
J)pfondant J. B. Walker was unaware that anyone other 
than himself had ever signed it (R. 188 and 203), and 
had been informed by Alma Smith (R. 188) that the 
document was unsigned . 
.Tolin A. Walker died in 1912, leaving a family con-
sisting of his 'vidow and six children, the oldest of whom 
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( J. B.) was twenty years of age; the youngeest of whom 
(Austin) was eight years of age. He also left for the 
support of this widow and six children the Parcel "A" 
in question here, which was heavily mortgaged; also a 
store known as Union Co-op, deep in debt, and with 
law suits by Z. C. M. I. pending against it (R. 322). Both 
tracts had been sold by the sheriff, and the period for re-
demption had expired. 
The primary responsibility for feeding the family 
and paying the debts rested, of course, upon the wido\\· 
and her two oldest sons, J. B. and R. E. She operated 
the store until it was taken over by the Association of 
Credit Men on behalf of Z. C. M. I., and its real estate 
(Tract B) was sold by execution sale (R. 322). Her 
two sons finally finished their schooling and they there-
after got jobs and also engaged in trucking activities, 
finally forming a partnership kno-wn as .J. B. and R. E. 
Walker (R. 167). 
The widow herself, in her efforts to pay the debts 
and raise the family, made some mortgages on the pro11-
erty in her name, but finally in 1922 she and the other 
heirs, in a final effort to save something, turned the en-
tire matter over to the oldest son, J. B. Walker, who 
was willing to undertake the job of seeing what could be 
done. That is when H. A. Smith prepared and the heirs 
signed the document (Ex. P-7), the long forgotten in-
strument. Thereafter the entire family proceeded to let 
the entire matter be forgotten until about 1955, when real 
estate values made the area valuable for subdivision 
purposes. Defendant J. B. Walker in 1922 made an in-
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dependent agreement with Dayton for purchase of the 
home tract; raised the money to pay him; and on the 
19th day of October, 1922, (Ex. D-30, P. 102), received 
a 1kcd to Tract ''A.'' He also made a deal with the 
Association of Credit Men, and on the 24th day of Au-
gust, 1923 (Ex. D-30, P. 61), received a deed to 
rrract "B." 
So the matter has rested for forty years, until this 
action was commenced on October 16, 1962, to impress a 
trust on the real property upon the equitable theory that, 
in acquiring these properties, defendant was acting for 
arnl on behalf of the heirs of John A. Walker and as their 
agent. Defendant J. B. Walker, in his answer (R. 14-15) 
denied that the effect of his agreement was to create a 
trust, and alleged affirmatively that the claims of plain-
tiffs were barred by the Statute of Limitations and laches, 
and that the rights, if any, of plaintiff, have not been 
timely prosecuted. He also alleged that the plaintiffs 
have never at any time in the past offered to do equity 
hy tendering to defendant the moneys expended by him 
for the acquisition of the property and for taxes and 
maintenance of the property, and that plaintiffs are not 
now offering to do equity in that regard and that by rea-
son of their silence and long inaction they are estopped 
to deny the title of defendant. 
The Trial Court had pre-trial hearing (R. 59-66) at 
which the issues were defined. In the meantime the writ-
ten document had been found and its genuineness was ad-
mitted. Among the things set forth in the pre-trial order 
is a statement that it is the contention of plaintiffs with 
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reference to any properties not specifically described in 
the agreement (Ex. 7), that those other properties were 
also acquired and management by defendant for the 
benefit of the members of the family upon the same trust 
and under the same conditions as those described in the 
document (R. 61). 
J. B. and R. E. Walker operated as a partnership dur-
ing the 1920's and 1930's until incorporation on July 7, 
1933. Immediately prior to incorporation Mr. L. R. 
Snow, auditor, prepared a balance sheet (Ex. D-24) show-
ing the assets, liabilities and capital accounts of the part-
nership. Among the assets was listed this real estate as 
having a value of $7,550.55. However, Mr. Cope, an-
other auditor produced by plaintiffs, testified (R. 281 and 
Ex. D-33) that the tax return filed by the partnership, 
prepared by Mr. Murray Stewart, contained the following 
notation: 
''Partnership returns of the 1920 's prepared by 
Murray Stewart indicated that the original assets 
were owned by J.B. Walker and merely loaned to 
the partnership.'' 
In the Articles of Incorporation (Ex. D-25), all of 
the partnership assets and business were conveyed to the 
corporation in full payment of the corporate stock, and 
thereafter, on June 6, 1959, R. E. Walker assigned and 
conveyed to defendant J. B. vValker all of his stock in the 
corporation (Ex. P-31 and Finding of Fact 10; R-73). 
The matter of tax payments and source of funds will 
be discussed under pertinent arguments relating to such 
matters. There was no actual conveyance by .J. B. 
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\\'a Iker of ihc real estate in question to either the part-
JINsliip or the corporation, but the real estate was carried 
011 111e hooks of both the partnership and the corpora-
tio11 as assets belonging to them respectively, and Mr. 
Cope testified that he examined the corporate hooks for 
H. l<~. ·w a Iker before the sale of his corporate stock and 
tlrnt, among other documents given to him, was a state-
rm11t of assets and liabilities (Ex. P-34) sho,ving as 
nsse1.s certain machinery, equipment and real property; 
nlso <1 clc•preciation schedule showing the real estate and 
hniklings claimed to be owned by the corporation. It was 
11po11 that basis that Mr. R. E. Walker sold his stock, 
aftn imlt>pcndent investigation and with the aid of a 
certified public accountant and the advice of his lawyer. 
TIH•re was consi<lera ble testimony pro and con as 
to the son rce of funds for acquisition of the property by 
t1rfrm1::rnt and for payment of .taxes between 1922 and 
the present time. These matters will be hereafter dis-
cussed. rrhe Trial Court found that defendant J. B. 
W nlker was entitled to reimbursement in accordance with 
the terms of the agreement (Ex. 7). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT THE AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 9, 
1922 (EX. P-7) WAS CONCLUSIVE AS TO 
THE AMOUNT FOR WHICH DEFENDANT 
.T. B. WALKER WAS TO BE REIMBURSED 
ON ACCOUNT OF REPURCHASE OF THE 
PROPERTY, AND PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
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GO BACK OF THAT DATE AND CONDUCT 
A FAl\ULY ACCOUNTING OF CREDITS AND 
DEBITS ON THE TRANSACTIONS LEADING 
UP TO AND ENTERING INTO THE TRANS. 
ACTIONS. 
Appellants go to great length in their argument un-
der Point I, to present a computation under the heading 
"Relief Sought on Appeal" on Pages 4-6 of their brief, 
in an effort to show what the mathematical result of such 
a family accounting in 1922 should have been. 
There are many things wrong with what appellants 
are urging. In the first place they are disregarding a 
basic principal of law that when parties have reduced 
their agreement to \niting and have arrived at an agree-
ment, all prior undenitandings, conversations and com-
putations are deemed to be merged in the new written 
document in the absence of fraud. We do not deem it 
necessary to cite law to this Court on that proposition. 
In addition, appellants choose to ignore the evi-
dence, which the Trial Court chose to believe. Between 
1912, when the father died, and 1922, defendant had been 
the mainstay and "breadwinner" of the family. During 
that period he had paid off several obligations of his 
mother and had given his mother all of his earnings 
(R. 183). 
The written agreement clearly states the amount of 
the Dayton claim as $4,647.84 with interest thereon, and 
that in the event J. B. is willing to undertake the respon-
sibility and pay off Dayton and other claimants, he is to 
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lie' reimbursed for what he has to pay out in accomplish-
i11.~ t hl' < k·sire<l en<l. The property was already lost. The 
period of redemption from Sheriff's Sale had already 
expired. (See Entry 96 of the Abstract, Ex. D-30.) 
The parties were not then interested in a family ac-
eountiug as appellants now contend they should have 
hren. They were interested in trying to keep a roof over 
the heads of a widow and six children; and the only mem-
ber of the family who was willing to undertake that seem-
in~dy hopelrss task was defendant. 
Regardless of how the agreement was forgotten; 
regardless of how its existence was denied; and regard-
less of the failure of plaintiffs to assert their rights under 
the agrrement for approximately forty-two years, the 
pffort served its primary purpose. Defendant raised the 
money; he acquired the home and the store, and the Day-
ton tract has remained the family home to this day. The 
agreement does not call for a family audit and expressly 
sets forth the amount that '' J. B. '' is to be repaid if the 
family, at some future date, is to acquire an undivided 
eight-ninth (8/9) interest in it. 
The Trial Court correctly applied the law in that 
regard. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED 
AND FOUND THAT WHATEVER INTEREST 
THE PARTNERSHIP (J.B. & R. E. WALKER) 
HAD OR EVER HAD IN THE REAL ESTATE, 
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PASSED TO rrHE CORPORA_rrION Ai'\Tl 
THA'f NQN_BJ 01~ rrHE PLAINTIFFS, fa_ 
CLUDING R. K \V ALKER, HAS ANY IN'rER 
EST IN rrH:BJ CORPORArrION. 
It is most difficult to understand how plaintiffs can 
pretend to claim any advantage by asserting, as they 
do under Point II, that in all of those years since 1933 tht' 
partnership has retained some residual interest in this 
property. Plaintiffs, other than R. E. vValker, were 
never members of the partnership or stockholders in the 
corporation. It is nowhere ch~imecl or asserted that the 
partnership, as such, ever had a fiduciary relationship to 
plaintiffs. The only place where the partnership enters 
the picture at all is, as set forth in the Complaint, wl1ere 
the allegation is made in Paragraph 14 (R. 3) that plain-
tiffs shouldn't be required to reimburse anyone for any-
thing because the partnership was, prior to 1922, indehtetl 
to the estate of J. A. Walker for moneys advanced, aml 
that the money used to purchase the Dayton tract was 
in fact paid by the partnership and was but a repayment 
by the partnership of its debt. This theory is nothing 
but plain everyday sophistry, and flies right in the teeth 
of the express ·wording of the written agreement and the 
evidence presented to the Trial Court. 
Regardless of the conflict in evidence as to when 
the partnership had its inception, there is no doubt at all 
as to the relationship of R. E. \Valker to this transac-
tion. He is one of the parties of the first vart in Ex. 7, 
who acquires the right to buy in, if, as and when "J.B.'' 
is successful in his efforts to raise the money and repur-
chase the lost property. That is the relationship, ancl the 
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onl; rcla tionship, to this property that R. E. Walker re-
tni 11rd for himself in his settlement with J. B. in June, 
l '.i.J~l, Ile did 11ot sign with ".J. B." as a raiser of funds 
in 1922, nor does he in 1959 reserve or retain any inter-
est i11 any funds to be reimbursed to '' J. B.'' The only 
rcsen-nti011 in 1959 is the right to assert his interest in 
the proprrty of the John Alvin Walker estate. This is 
exactly \d1at he is asserting in the Complaint, along with 
the othrr heirs, as a beneficiary of an alleged trust; and 
that is exactly what the Trial Court gave him and what 
he will g<'t if he puts up his share of the money. 
rrl1e partnership has been out of existence for thirty 
Prior to incorporation, regardless of the source of 
furnls for meeting payments to Dayton, and regardless 
of the issue as to whether, in periodic accounts between 
the partners, the payments were charged to J. B., it is 
nndispnted in the evidence that the property, after acqui-
sition of Tract "A" from Dayton and of Tract "B" from 
the Association of Credit Men, was carried on the part-
nership books as an asset (R. 282). That would be true 
whether it was owned personally or jointly as a partner-
sl1ip assets. All personally owned assets are liable for 
partnership liabilities. The tax returns, however, as be-
fore stated, carried the notation that the property be-
longed to "J. B." but was loaned to the partnership. 
At the time of incorporation, the property was list-
e<l in the balance sheet (Ex. D-24) as an asset of the part-
11ership to he conveyed to the corporation in payment of 
stock. 
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The property was picked up by the corporation as 
an asset and has been carried and used as such for bond-
ing and credit purposes from 1933 to the present time. 
During that period from 1933 to 1959 (26 years) 
R. E. Walker was Secretary and Treasurer of the cor-
poration. He cannot now claim ignorance of such facts. 
When he parted from '' J. B.'' in 1959 he hired a C.P.A. 
to make an examination of the corporate books and Mr. 
Cope produced the document which he used (Ex. P-34) 
which shows on its face an entry for machinery, equip-
ment, and real property, which included this property, on 
the schedule attached. When he sold his stock he sold 
any interest which he ever had as a partner or as a stock-
holder. 
The Trial Court correctly found his issue against 
plaintiffs. The evidence was overwhelmingly against 
R. E. on this point. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND 
THAT THE COMPUTATION OF INTEREST 
COMMENCED WITH 1922. 
This point deserves little or no attention. It is such 
an obvious attempt to play on words that it should be 
disregarded without comment. 
As we read it, it is that J. B. is to be reimbursed 
only for what he personally pays out; and that if he had 
the partnership make the payments on his behalf and then 
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chargf; it to his account in periodic settlements, or if he 
h:u1 the partnership and the corporation pay it and carry 
it for him, with him ultimately acquiring the entire bene-
ficial interest through stock ownership, that some way, 
somehow this method of handling it acted as a release for 
the benefit of plaintiffs from the obligation to pay interest 
if they ·wanted to exercise their right to acquire. 
Plaintiffs cite no law to such effect because there is 
none. F.xcepting R. E., who sold his interest in the 
partnership for stock and then sold his stock to J. B. for 
cash, none of the plaintiffs ever at any time had any in-
terest in either of those entities. Their rights and their 
ohligations are contractual as set forth in Ex. 7, and no 
play on words can be used in a Court of Equity to operate 
to release them from the proper payment of principal and 
interest on all amounts paid to acquire the property, re-
gardless of the source of funds from which J. B. obtained 
them, and notwithstanding any internal accountings used 
by the bookkeepers for the partnership and the corpora-
tion in adjusting equities between the partners or the 
two principal stockholders. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
THE MOTION OF APPELLANTS TO CON-
VERT THE CASE INTO A MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURE ACTION AFTER IT HAD 
BEEN INITIATED AND TRIED BY PLAIN-
TIFFS AS AN ACTION IN EQUITY TO IM-
PRESS THE LEGAL TITLE WITH A TRUST 
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS. 
13 
Plaintiffs' Complaint clearly alleges legal title in de-
fendant; that he acquired such title as an agent actiug 
for and on behalf of Minnetta vValker and the hein 
( R. 2-3) ; that he is ho] ding the title in trust for all of 
the heirs. Upon that theory the case was defined in the 
pre-trial order (R. 61), and upon that theory the case was 
tried. After the Trial Court had announced its decision 
and had directed the preparation of Findings, Conclu-
sions and Decree in accordance vvith its decision, then 
for the first time plaintiffs sought to have the Trial Court 
change the nature of plaintiffs' claimed relationship with 
rlefendant to that of mortgagor and mortgagee from the 
fiduciary relationship of agency. This the Trial Court 
properly refused to permit them to do. 
Exhibit 7 speaks for itself. A reading of it shows it 
to be an authorization to purchase the tracts, with a right 
of the heirs to buy in upon payment of eight-ninths (8/9) 
of the purchase price, together with interest and all nec-
essary costs incurred by defendant. One thing is cer-
tain, in view of the history of the family, as set forth in 
the Statement of Facts, they did not intend by that docu-
ment to produce another debtor and creditor relationship 
with more foreclosure sales, at least not in the imme-
diate future. These two pieces of property had just gone 
through two judicial sales with no buyers. 
There were two possible views that might be taken 
by the Court as to the remedy accruing to plaintiffs ont 
of the relationship established by Exhibit 7: (a) Trustee-
ship arising out of agency; or (b) an option by the heirs 
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tu acqmre their proportionate share of the title at 
some time in the future after demand. The fact that 
110 oHe knew of the existen<lt of Exhibit 7, or, if they 
('\'er knew of its existence, had forgotten it during the 
lapse of forty-two years, and the further fact that Alma 
Smith had advised defendant that the document had 
never Leeu signed by plaintiffs, actuated the conduct of 
the parties in their dealings with each other during that 
long period of time. One thing, however, was never 
changed: the primary objective of defendant was to pro-
Yicle a home for his mother and her family and this was 
accomplished by defendant. For forty-two years the 
family has liYed in the home rent free, without even so 
murh as payment of taxes, and the Court will note that 
in his claims for credit defendant has asked no account-
ing for rentals for occupancy, by the other members of 
the family, since he left the parental home in 1931. 
After the discovery of Exhibit 7, plaintiffs still elect-
ed to claim and assert that the document created the 
relationship of trustee and cestui que trust, arising out 
of agency, and the Trial Court at the very inception of 
the trial accepted that theory and all evidence produced 
at the trial was directed to other issues relating to results 
of that relationship. 
Iii their belated effort the change the case from one 
of equity to a statutory action in foreclosure, plaintiffs 
had apparently entirely forgotten some of the maxims of 
e11uity which are a uecessary part of any proceeding to 
have a deed declared to be a mortgage ; and also com-
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pletely overlooked that there is a vast difference between 
the relationship of a trustee to the cestiti que trust and 
that of a mortgagor to a mortgagee. 
One of the first things we learn in law school is that 
trusts have to do with equity, and he who comes into 
equity seeking its aid must offer to do equity. A deed 
valid on its face is only changed in effect to a mortgage 
by a proceeding in equity, and one of the most impor-
tant things you have to do in seeking the aid of equity is 
to offer to do equity; also, you must act promptly and 
you must be sure you are not barred by having slept too 
long on your rights. 
In this connection appellants completely misunder-
stand the legal points involved in Point IV of their own 
brief. They assume that by some sort of legerdemain 
the relationship between appellants and respondent is 
that of mortgagor and mortgagee. They further assume 
that respondent has only a lien on the disputed lands, 
and then based upon that faulty assumption, argue that 
the only procedure available to respondent is to foreclose 
this imaginary mortgage. It is true that Exhibit 7 says 
that defendant is to have a lien for his advancements, but 
that does not necessarily say that the relationship of de-
fendant to plaintiffs is changed from that of trustee to 
that of mortgagee. Every agent who advances funds for 
his principal has a lien on the property of the principal 
in his possession for repayment of the funds advanced, 
but is an an equitable lien arising out of his fiduciary re-
lationship and his right is to retain the property until the 
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principal reimburses him or until the principal loses his 
righ! through laches or some other method instituted by 
the agent himself. This is recognized basic law. See Re-
statement of the Law under "Agency," Sec. 14-B, and 
Sec. 464. It is also announced in 2 Am. Jur. 244, Sec. 
3l:i under "Agency." Agency is a :fiduciary relation-
ship, and is one of the confidential relationships pro-
tected by the maxims of equity. The mortgagor and 
mortgagee relationship is not :fiduciary and operates only 
under the statutes and the common law. 
ln 1922 all of the parties to this action were stran-
gers to the title. The tracts were then vested in third 
parties. Plaintiffs could not grant unto respondent a 
lien upon lands which they did not own, nor was respond-
ent under any legal obligation to undertake to pay off the 
old family debts nor to repurchase the property. He 
rould have purchased the property from Dayton and 
the Association of Credit Men without any authorization 
from plaintiffs. He did not absolutely undertake to do 
anything. He was merely authorized to do so, if such he 
desired to do. Appellants could not grant and did not 
grant a lien to respondent beyond that which the law 
of agency already gave him. Exhibit 7 authorizes de-
fendant, so far as plaintiffs are concerned, to acquire 
title from the strangers who then owned it. The first 
time plaintiffs acquired a right to anything was after de-
fendant had taken title. The Trial Court has held that 
in so doing he acquired the title in trust and that if, as 
aud when plaintiffs tender a full reimbursement to de-
fendant for the amount expended, with interest, they will 
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be entitled to eight-ninths (8/9) of the legal title. The) 
will then become joint owners with defendant, which is 
the relatio11ship intended to be established by Ex. 7. 
Respondent has never had any need to institute a 
foreclosure action. He is already the record owner of the 
unencumlJered legal title which he has held since 1922, 
subject only to the right of plaintiffs to buy in if they de-
sire to do so. The next move is up to appellants. Abseut 
such a move on their part within the time limited by 
laches, defendant remains the owner of the title. Plain-
tiffs can only come into a Court of Equity after an offer 
to do equity and they can expect equitable relief only 
upon that lJasis. 
In the case of Bybee v. Stuart, (112 Ut. 462, 189 P. 
2nd 118) cited by appellants, it \Vill be noted that in that 
case plaintiffs tendered to defendant the full amount 
owed to defendant and then demanded a deed, and upon 
appeal this Court stated that plaintiffs were entitled to 
recover because the transaction was in the nature of an 
equitable mortgage and they were entitled to be regarded 
as legal owners because they were willing to pay the 
debt. That is exactly what the Trial Court has held in 
this case, and it did so upon the basis of the claim of plain-
tiffs that a trust had resulted from the fiduciary relation-
ship of agency created by Exhibit 7. The difference is, 
of course, that in this case plaintiffs do not want to do any 
paying before obtaining their interest in the land. 
The following authorities sustain the action of the 
Trial Court in its determination of this question: 
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Culalwn v. Srnyth (Ore.) 81 Pac. 2d 112 
!lerrnwm1 v. Churchill (Ore.) 385 P. 2d 190 
:-:fi Am. J ur. 790, Sec. 196 under Mortgages 
3;1 Am. Jur. 441, Sec. 45 under Liens 
If the Court had changed the case into a mortgage 
forcrlosure, plaintiffs would have had the difficulty of 
overcoming the seven-year Statute of Limitations con-
tained in Sec. 78-12-16, U.C.A. This would have been 
more devastating even than the doctrine of laches which 
is elt-Jewhere presented, and they would not then have had 
the right to offer to do equity which the Trial Court gave 
them iD this case. They could not have then avoided the 
full force of that Statute of Limitations by showing that 
they ~were holding the property under adverse possession 
as dc>fowd by Sec. 78-12-12, U.C.A. 1953, because they 
ne\'er at any time paid or offered to pay any taxes. The 
Trial Court went all the way in an effort to give plain-
tiffs the utmost in the way of rights that could possibly 
he established. 
POINT V. 
THJ1J COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE 
RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT WAS NOT 
BARHED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS. 
The argument of plaintiffs under this point is unique 
i11 the amials of jurisprudence. As \Ve understand it, the 
erux of the argument amounts to this: the rights of 
plaintiffs to ae<1uire an interest in the title under Exhibit 
7 nre 11ot barred by laches or the Statute of Limitations, 
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but that the right of defendant to be reimbursed for his 
expenditures has been lost by reason of the Statute of 
Limitations, because, as they say, ''J.B.'' saw fit to carry 
the costs 'vith him into the partnership and thence into 
the corporation. That is typical of the whole attitude of 
plaintiffs toward this transaction. 
For forty-three ( 43) years they have had a free 
ride on this matter. Since 1931 when defendant and his 
·wife moved out of the parental home, no one has testified 
to a single benefit of any kind that he has had from his 
efforts to save the property and provide a home for his 
mother and her family. 
On the other hand, with the exception of R. E. Walk-
er, who moved out after his marriage in 1924, and occa-
sional short periods of absence for some of the female 
plaintiffs, they and their families have lived there rent 
free for forty-three ( 43) years. The only reward that 
defendant has had is the privilege of getting out and 
raising the money to repurchase the property ; and the 
privilege of paying or causing to be paid the taxes, in-
surance, water assessments and the cost of re-roofing 
the house and fighting the problems incident to protect-
ing the water rights. One of the plaintiffs even refused 
to stipulate with the rest of the family that the $800.00 
still remaining in the hands of Alma Smith might be 
paid over to their mother before she died. 
On this point, defendant submits that plaintiffs have 
certainly placed themselves beyond the pale for any con-




THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HA VE FOUND 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFFS 
WERE GUILTY OF LA CHES BY FAILING 
FOR FORTY YEARS TO ASSERT THEIR 
RIGHTS, IF ANY THEY CLAIMED. 
If this Court sustains the Trial Court in its decision 
that the rights of plaintiffs were not lost through !aches 
and by operation of the Statute of Limitations, such de-
cision will probably stand as a new landmark as to the 
lrngth of time that parties may, with impunity, sleep on 
their rights before asserting or attempting to assert 
them. To lrn exact, it is forty ( 40) years and seven (7) 
days between October 9, 1922, when Exhibit 7 was exe-
cuted, and October 16, 1962, when the Complaint in this 
action was filed. Up to this time the longest period of 
record seems to be twenty (20) years, which was estab-
lished in the case of Petterson v. Ogden City, 111 Ut. 125, 
176 P. ~d 599. In that case Ogden City was excused from 
asserting its lien because of the fact that the statute re-
lating to special improvements gave the City no inde-
pendent right of enforcement. The clear import of the 
decision is that if the City had had a right of enforcement 
under the statute, it would have been barred by laches. 
rrhere 1wver was a time after 1922 when these plaintiffs 
could not have asserted their rights, if they felt they had 
auy, by tendering their share of the money with interest 
and eo:sts, and demanding eight-ninths (8/9) of the title. 
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VV e will not Lurden this Court with a lengthy discu~­
sion of the doctrine of laches. It is basic and was well set 
forth by this Court in the case of Ruthrauff v. Silver King 
-i;vestern Mining and Milling Conipany, 95 Ut. 279, 80 P. 
2d 338. There is also a general discussion in 19 Am. J ur., 
Sec. 489, under Equity. While lapse of time generally 
may not be a bar, it is always a bar whenever the lapse 
of time is accompanied by a change of condition to the 
detriment of the defendant or to the advantage of plain-
tiffs. The case of Duncarn v. Colorado Inv. and Realty 
Co., (Colo.) 178 P. 2d 428, seems most apropos. Chief 
Justice Burke, speaking for a unanimous Court, spoke 
as follows: 
""\Vhat is reasonable time within which to as-
sert rights depends upon 'the circumstances of 
each particular case * * * The time in vvhich tlw 
courts have treated demands as stale varies from 
four to twenty years.' (Sears v. Hicklin, 13 Colo. 
143, 154, 21P.1022, 1025) * * * 
"In the decades which have passed since that 
declaration we have found no case raising that 
maximum and are loath to do so now with no 
better excuse for the delay than here appears. 
"The defense is particularly applicable in 
cases of notable increase, or probable increase, in 
value, where the former owner has evaded all risk 
and responsibility until time has brought to frui-
tion the faith of his adversary.'' 
The case of Hamud v. Hawthorne, 338 P. 2d 387, de-
cided by the Supreme Court of California in 1959 denied 
a similar right to have a deed declared to be a mortgage 
after five years where there had been such a change of 
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rnlue8 ;u; to be prejudicial to the one who was holding 
tJ1e lrgal title and would have still been left with it if 
rnlues had not changed for the better. The law discussed 
as applied by the California Supreme Court is bad medi-
cine for those who want to do nothing and then speak 
only if fortune favors them to do so. 
In this case the plaintiffs failed to assert their rights 
Jming the depression when defendant had to get out and 
scrounge to get the money to pay taxes. They never 
lifted their voices until approximately 1955, when it 
apparently became profitable for them to do so. In the 
meantime, the one witness to this entire transaction, their 
mother, who knew all of the facts and who could have 
spoken as to where equity lay on the so-called accounting 
matters, 1Yas stilled in death. The entire attack by plain-
tlffa in this case was grounded in an attempt to have a 
belated accounting of family affairs back to 1912. This 
is the basis of their entire first point; namely, that an 
accounting would have shown that "J. B." was in fact 
in 1922 indebted to his mother. Their next attack was 
that an accounting of transactions between J. B. and 
R. E. between 1922 and 1933, when they were partners, 
I\ ould show that J. B. was indebted to R. E., and their 
final attack was an attempt to have another accounting of 
l'Orporate affairs between 1933 and 1959. At the end of 
each of those periods there had been a settlement between 
ilie parties. Assuming that there should have been more 
complete eorporate records, beyond the CPA investigation 
that 1\lr. Cope made as a basis for the settlement between 
R. E. arnl J. B. in 1959, it was certainly prejudicial, 
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unfair and extremely inequitable for plaintiffs to try to 
go back and demand accounting of intimate family af. 
fairs commencing fifty-two (52) years ago. One look 
at the evidence presented by plaintiffs in this case was as 
to where hay was bought, where grain was bought, how 
much the mother charged for board, whether employees 
were charged board, how much an old farm horse was 
worth, what became of the team that was used on the 
the farm; those and many other kindred things were the 
ones that these parties were trying to produce as the 
basis for their accounting. The Trial Court, with great 
liberality, permitted them to do so and then believed, 
as is so well stated in his opinion, that the saviour of 
the home, the breadwinner and the benefactor of thi~ 
whole family transaction was the defendant, J. B. 
Walker. Certainly in the light of the many changin,g 
events that have come and gone since 1912 and 1922, 
equity should have stepped in and dismissed the case at 
the inception for failure to assert such rights as they 
claimed many, many years ago. In this connection the 
Court will note that at the request of Mrs. Minetta 
Walker, Alma Smith wrote to J. B. Walker (Ex. P-15) 
on November 10, 1949, asking him how much money he 
had had to advance on the Dayton mortgage. On July 
16, 1952 (Ex. P-14) Mr. Walker gave the amount to 
Mr. Smith but even that modest effort produced no inter· 
est in putting up any money on the part of anyone. And 
so the matter rested for another twelve (12) years until 
this suit was filed. 
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POINT II 
'I'II1£ TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE AL-
LOWED DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR ALL 
_MONEYS EXPENDED FOR TAXES AND 
OTHER PURPOSES ON PARCELS "A" 
AND ''B.'' 
Defendant was permitted to produce evidence by 
Exhibits D-20, D-21, D-23, D-40 to D-45, inclusive, as to 
the amount that had been expended on account of taxes 
and for other purposes on these various tracts between 
1922 and the date of trial. However, the Court then, in 
its decision commencing at Page 412 of the Record, stated 
that }1e would refuse to allow defendant anything for 
taxes. He did so primarily upon the basis that the pay-
me11t of tax ·were not contemplated by the agreement. He 
also stated that since the parties were living in the place 
as a homr, whoever paid the taxes was getting value out 
of it and that he would asse~s no credit in favor of J. B. 
for taxes that were paid. He did allow some small 
amounts for moneys paid for attorney's fees to Henry D. 
}foyle arnl for placing a roof on the home; otherwise, all 
such moneys paid out by defendant or by the corporation 
or h~· A. L. Walker under agreement with J. B. on ac-
rnullt of taxes or othenvise were disallowed. 
Tt is undisputed in the evidence that none of these 
plaiutiff s ever paid any taxes, excepting possibly one 
year when Ila may have paid them. They lived in and 
ocl·upi(_•d the place hut never paid any taxes. It is like-
wise lllldisputed that J. B. and his wife left the parental 
home in 193], and there is not a word of evidence that he 
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ever received any be11cfits whatsoever from the placr· 
after 1931. As a trustee, in accordance ·with the Court's 
determination, it was his duty to pay the taxes or to 
see that they were paid. As owner of the legal tit1p 
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he had, under the statute, the right to possess and occ·ni'r 
the tracts, and the right to the rents, issues and profits of 
the place. It was entirely bis o\vn private arrangement 
with the partnership, corporation, and later \vith A. L 
Walker by which the taxes for a portion of the time wr!'i· 
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paid by them. I "¥s difficult to see how, under any cir-
cumstances, these plaintiffs would be entitled to t~ 1 r 
benefit of that arrangement and be permitted to use and 
occupy the home and not be chargeable "'·ith the paymcut 
of rental or taxes at least to the extent of reimbursi11g 
J. B. for all taxes that he paid personally and all tm;~, 
that were paid by either the partnership or the corpora 
tion. He acquired :ill of the rights of both the partner, 
ship and the corporation when he acquired the entin 
stock interest of R. E. \Valker at the time of settlement 
in 1959, subject only to any rights that R. E. might ha1c 
as an heir, as elsewhere stated. 
The Trial Court clearly erred in refusing to give !he 
defendant a right to reimbursement for those items. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HA VE AL-
LOWED DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR FUNDS 
PAID OUT FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
OTHER TRACTS INVOLVED IN THE LITI-
GATION. 
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, \ t i hL1 1 ime of pre-trial conference, the issues were 
de11J1('1 I mu l the claim of plaintiff was expressly stated in 
till' following language: 
""With reference to any properties which are not 
specifically described in that agreement (Ex. 7), 
ii is the conteution of plaintiffs that defendant 
.J. B. \Valker acquired those properties on the 
same trust, to use and manage them for the bene-
fit of the members of the family and particularly 
for his mother until her death." 
Defcn<lant .J. B. Walker presented and offered to 
pre~011t 1•Yidc11ce of the fact that he had personally paid 
mortgages, and redeemed from sale, and paid taxes on 
tlH~ property standing in the name of his mother during 
tl1e time that she owned it and before it was conveyed to 
,\. L. Walker. Legal title to that tract was in the name 
of the mother at the time Exhibit 7 was entered into, 
alld it was a part of the family problem, as it was a part 
uf t lie fa rm. It was known as the "creek" property and 
was used primarily for raising crops. This particular 
pi0cr of grnund is the subject of litigation in the other 
action pending by plaintiffs against Austin Walker, and 
which aetion \Vas joined with this case for consideration 
nf issues at the time of pre-trial conference (R. 59-66). 
U ndPr the issues as framed, the Trial Court was 
ckarl)· i11 Prror (R. 417) in denying the right of defend-
;mt .J. R. ·walker to reimbursement for moneys advanced 
h:· him for the liquidation of mortgages and payment of 
1ax1·s ou that tract. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court should have dismissed the action 
on the basis of laches and failure to offer to do equity on 
the part of plaintiffs. Having refused to do so, the Court 
should have also allowed defendant full credit for all 
expenditures made by him or on his behalf, for taxes aud 
otherwise, in the protection and safeguarding of the 
Dayton and Union Mere. tracts; also for moneys expend-
ed by defendant in the management and safeguarding 
of the tract standing in the name of Minetta Walker, 
the mother. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. ARNOLD RICH and 
MAX K. MANGUM 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent, 
J.B. Walker 
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